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Sammendrag 
Tidligere studier viser at pekuniær belønning generelt ikke er hovedmotivasjonen for overganger fra 
vanlig lønnsarbeid til entreprenørskap. Vi revurderer i denne analysen de pekuniære gevinstene og 
risikoen ved entreprenørskap, ved å bruke et enhetlig og fleksibelt økonometrisk rammeverk.  Vi tar 
hensyn til selv-seleksjon og undersøker i hvilken grad tidligere analyser er kommet til feilslutninger 
fordi en har blandet sammen individer uten interessante lønnsalternativer med de som har en høy 
alternativ inntekt i arbeidsmarkedet når beslutningen om etablering tas. Vi analyserer registerdata som 
omfatter hele den norske sysselsatte befolkingen i perioden 2001-2011 og definerer en entreprenør 
som en person som enten er innehaver av et nyetablert enkeltmannsforetak (selvstendig 
næringsdrivende), eller er aktiv eier i et nyetablert aksjeselskap (AS) – i det siste tilfellet har han/hun 
minst blokkerende mindretall (33 prosent eierandel) og er i tillegg enten ansatt i foretaket eller har en 
formell rolle som daglig leder, styreformann eller begge. Våre resultater viser at den gjennomsnittlige 
«avkastningen» av entreprenørskap er signifikant negativ blant de som blir selvstendig 
næringsdrivende (etablerer enkeltmannsforetak). Videre finner vi at entreprenører som etablerer 
foretak ved å skyte inn minimumskapitalkravet (eller nær minimumskravet) i et AS har en signifikant 
positiv, men beskjeden, avkastning av etableringen. Til slutt finner vi at gruppen entreprenører som 
skyter inn minst to ganger minimumskravet i et nystartet AS, i gjennomsnitt øker sin (arbeidsrelaterte) 
inntekt med 10 prosent sammenlignet med hva den ville ha vært dersom de hadde fortsatt som vanlige 
lønnsmottakere. 
1 Introduction
A large literature has emerged examining returns to entrepreneurship (Aastebro,
2010; Aastebro and Chen, 2014; Berkhout et al., 2011). A seminal contribution
is Hamilton (2000), who examines di¤erences in the earnings distribution of wage-
earners and self-employed persons using a traditional Mincer-type earnings equation
framework. He nds that entrepreneurs have, cet. par., lower initial earnings and
lower earnings growth than wage-earners and that their earnings distribution ex-
hibits wider dispersion. Hamilton also shows that the earnings di¤erential is not
due to self-selection of low ability employees into entrepreneurship. The consensus
based on Hamiltons study and follow-up studies is that the pecuniary returns to
entrepreneurship are not the driving force of an individuals decision to switch from
wage employment to entrepreneurship (Astebro, 2010: Astebro and Chen, 2014).
Four sets of discussions to better understand this entrepreneurial earnings puzzle
have developed since.
The rst is that non-pecuniary benets from entrepreneurship must be substan-
tial (e.g., Benz and Frey, 2008; Blanchower and Oswald, 1998; Carter, 2011; Mc-
Cra¤rey, 2014). Second, other factors than mere rational expectations might lead to
the choice of entrepreneurship such as genetic and environmental factors (Lindquist
et al., 2015; Nicolaou et al., 2008) or cognitive biases (Holm et al., 2013) aris-
ing from, for instance, overoptimism (Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006; Dushnitsky, 2010)
and/or overcondence (Hayward et al., 2006) or a lower level of risk or loss-aversion
(Hvide and Panos, 2014; Koudstaal et al., 2014).
Third, researchers have also attributed the lack of evidence of an e¤ect of entre-
preneurial income to the low quality of entrepreneurial income data (Parker, 2009).
Indeed, measuring business incomes is notoriously di¢ cult due to a lack of unequiv-
ocal accounting and reporting methods and misreporting (Astebro and Chen, 2014;
Astebro, 2010; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007; Hurst et al., 2013). Moreover, the range
of possible outcomes is much wider and often not even foreseeable due to risk and
uncertainty (Astebro, 2010, Parker, 2009, Hamilton, 2000). No doubt, the lack of
a uniform concept of entrepreneurial income is also a problem for individuals who
consider starting up a venture. Supporting this idea, Berkhout et al. (2011) show
for a Dutch sample of young college and university graduates that decisions to be-
come entrepreneurs are indeed not a¤ected by the entrepreneurial income prospects.
However, the decision to become an entrepreneur is a¤ected signicantly by the in-
come prospects in wage-employment in their labor market segment, i.e., the better
observable and measurable opportunity costs of entrepreneurship.
Fourth, a new perspective is provided based on the debate about who is an
entrepreneur?. This perspective suggests the use of stricterdenitions of entre-
preneurship, thereby weeding out from the sample necessity entrepreneurs and
those self-employed who typically earn low incomes and experience little growth.
The resulting population of entrepreneurs would be more representative of the pop-
ulation of true Schumpeterianentrepreneurs. Denitions that have been used for
this purpose are, for instance, incorporated entrepreneurs (Levine and Rubinstein,
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2013), o¤ensive entrepreneurs, i.e., movements from wage-employment to entrepre-
neurship (thereby ignoring entrepreneurship originating from unemployment; see
Berglann et al., 2009), or even billionaire entrepreneurs (Henrekson and Sanandaji,
2014). Levine and Rubinstein show that incorporated business owners earn, on av-
erage, more than both unincorporated (self-employed) business owners and ordinary
wage workers. Wage workers earn, in turn, more than self-employed workers.
The main aim of our analysis is to contribute to a better understanding of the
entrepreneurial earnings puzzlethan currently available in the literature. We try
to do so based on two pillars: (i) data improvements and (ii) model improvements.
The data improvements are that we have a large and relatively long panel data
set covering the whole Norwegian population of rms and individuals from 2001 to
2011, where we can observe the initial earnings for given individuals before they
become entrepreneurs. In our analysis the initial condition is that the person is a
wage employer in 2001. Hence, we can focus on o¤ensive entrepreneurship. In con-
trast, self-employment as an alternative to unemployment or social benets is likely
to be less inuenced by future earnings prospects, and should be considered sepa-
rately (Hvide and Panos, 2014). Second, we observe very detailed measures of both
employment and entrepreneurship incomes in the registry. For the latter we have
detailed information on share ownership and valuation leading to the possibility of
measuring rm value growth and income from ownership in the case of incorpora-
tion (see also Hvide and Møen, 2010, using similar Norwegian registry data). We
acknowledge the self-selection problem and analyze to what extent earlier ndings
are obscured by mixing individuals who become entrepreneurs without interesting
wage alternatives (low ability) with those who do have a realistic alternative op-
portunity (high ability). We distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated
(self-employed) entrepreneurs.
Our estimation model has the following features: (i) It can be used to identify
whether persons who have a high general income ability are the ones who choose
to become entrepreneurs (selection by absolute advantage). We measure income
ability as the part of the income which is unchanged over time, irrespective of
the choice to become an entrepreneur. (ii) We can assess the average return to
entrepreneurship for those who become entrepreneurs, i.e. the increase in their
earnings by becoming entrepreneurs, compared to remaining wage earners (the
average treatment e¤ects on the treated). (iii) It allows entrepreneurial and wage
incomes to di¤er not only in terms of their expected value but also in terms of
variance. (iv) The choice to become an entrepreneur is considered endogenous with
respect to income prospects.
Using this combination of data and model improvements we show that the re-
turn to entrepreneurship is indeed positive when using a stricter denition of the
entrepreneur. While the average return to entrepreneurship is signicantly negative
for individuals entering entrepreneurship through self-employment (even if some of
them later incorporate their rm), entrepreneurs who establish rms by injecting
the minimum (or close to minimum) required amount of equity in an incorporated
rm at start-up, have a signicantly positive, but low return to entrepreneurship
on average. However, people who become entrepreneurs by establishing rms that
are at least twice as large as the minimum requirement, increase their earnings by
10 percent on average by becoming entrepreneurs. Besides, we identify a signi-
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cant positive selection by absolute advantage with regard to the choice of becoming
an incorporated entrepreneur. The estimated returns to entrepreneurship are not
signicantly di¤erent for men and women.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
modelling framework and in Section 3 the data. In Section 4 we discuss the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The modelling framework
In this section we specify the modelling framework for estimating the earnings equa-
tion and the choice equation of whether to become an entrepreneur. In principle,
we could use our panel data set to study transitions both into and out of entrepre-
neurship over time. However, to simplify the analysis, we will focus on one type of
transition: from initial full-time employment in 2001, dened as 30 hours or more
per week, to entrepreneurship in any of the years 2002-2011. The initial condition is
that the individual is a full time wage earner, thereby excluding unemployed individ-
uals from the sample. The motivation for this choice is that we wish to concentrate
on o¤ensive entrepreneurship choices rather than necessity or defensive entrepre-
neurship. Otherwise, it is di¢ cult to study the relative returns to the choice for
entrepreneurship.
The discrete choice we consider is the decision to become an entrepreneur during
the observation period, which is 2002-2011, given the initial condition in year 2001.
Thus the model assumes that the decision to become an entrepreneur is static, and
is related only to the initial or exogenous characteristics of the individual. The
actual timing of events (the years of transitions from one state two another) will
be considered as random conditional on this discrete choice. Some will become
entrepreneurs late in the period, and we may follow them as entrepreneurs only for
a year or two. Those who make the transition early can potentially be observed for a
longer time but some of them will exit entrepreneurship before the period is over.
Of course, a large majority of wage earners never become entrepreneurs. When a
transition occurs, there will be a shift in the earnings equation. The endogeneity of
the decision to become an entrepreneur means that pre- and post- decision earnings
may be correlated with the decision to become an entrepreneur.
2.1 Stochastic specication
Individual is state at time t is denoted Ent(i; t) 2 f0; 1g; where Ent(i; t) = 1 means
that the individual is an entrepreneur at time t and Ent(i; t) = 0 means that he
is not. For now we do not separate between di¤erent types of entrepreneurship,
but will return to this extension of the model at the end of the section. Initially
Ent(i; 0) = 0; for all individuals in the sample, i.e., they are full time wage earners
at t = 0.
The discrete choice variable, Ei, is dened as
Ei = max
t2[1;T ]
Ent(i; t):
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A typical event history may be i) Ent(i; t) = 0 for all t (the person remains a wage
earner), ii) E(i; t) jumps from 0 to 1 at t0 (entry into entrepreneurship), and iii)
E(i; t) drops back from 1 to 0 at t00 > t0 (exit from entrepreneurship, see Section 3
for its exact operationalization). To model the discrete choice variable Ei we follow
the framework of Dagsvik et al. (2011), which incorporates also an ordinal choice
variable Ei (see below): Let Xi be a continuous latent index representing both
individual is preferences and his opportunities of becoming an entrepreneur. The
endogenous choice variable Ei is related to Xi by
Ei = e i¤ e < X

i < e+1 , e = 0; 1; (1)
where 1 is an unknown threshold value, 0 =  1 and 2 = 1. Furthermore, we
assume that
Xi = Z1i1 + "1i; (2)
where Z1i is a row vector of exogenous variables a¤ecting the individuals choice (for
instance age and gender) pre-determined at t = 0, 1 is a xed, unknown coe¢ cient
vector and "1i is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit
variance. It is assumed that "1i is uncorrelated with Z1i by construction. That
is, (2) is the conditional distribution of Xi given Z1i. We are here not interested
in the causal e¤ect of Z1i (including e.g. education) on the choice to become an
entrepreneur per se. However, we will allow "1i to be correlated with earnings. That
is, any unobserved variable that a¤ects the entrepreneurship decision is allowed
to inuence earnings. This creates a self-selection problem that will be addressed
below. Equations (1)-(2) specify a Probit model for the binary choice variable, Ei.
The estimation of such a model is, of course, standard.
Our equation of main interest is the earnings relation. Our main focus will be
on the returns to entrepreneurship, i.e., the change in total labor related earnings
(wage-, entrepreneurial- and other) when a person switches from full time wage
employment to entrepreneurship during a time period. We propose a model which
is analogous to the two-sector model of Heckman and Sedlacek (1990). Let the
index i denote individual i, and Yit(0) and Yt(1) log earnings if individual i at t
when Ent(i; t) = 0 and Ent(i; t) = 1, respectively. Hence, log earnings for a person
who becomes an entrepreneur at t, switches from Yi;t 1(0) at t   1 to Yi;t(1) at t.
We assume that
Yit(0) = Z2it2 + "2i + uit(0)
Yit(1) = i + Z2it2 + "2i + uit(1), (3)
where i is the shift in income when person i changes from being a wage earner to an
entrepreneur. Z2it is a vector of explanatory variables, including (powers) of years
of experience, calendar time dummies, as well as variables from Zi1. Experience
is measured as age minus years of schooling (minus seven years), and thus reects
potential experience. The restriction that the coe¢ cients of Z2it (i.e., 2) are the
same in both equations facilitates the interpretation of the results. Finally, "2i is a
person-specic random e¤ect and uit(0) and uit(1) are the idiosyncratic error terms
in state Ent(i; t) = 0 and Ent(i; t) = 1, respectively.
To allow heterogeneity, i is an individual-specic coe¢ cient, with
E(ijEnt(i; t) = 1) = E(ijEi = 1) = : (4)
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That is,  is the average treatment e¤ect on the treated.
The (hypothetical) earnings di¤erence for the same person i in state 1 and 0,
i.e., his returns to entrepreneurship (i), equals
it = i + uit(1)  uit(0):
Thus the average earnings di¤erence (average treatment e¤ect) is
AT  E(i) (5)
and the average treatment e¤ect given treatment is
ATT  E(itjE = 1) = E(ijEi = 1) =  (6)
The average observed earnings di¤erentials between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs
(OD) everything else equal is given by
OD  ATT + E("2ijEi = 1)  E("2ijEi = 0): (7)
ATT is higher than AT if the idiosyncratic component in the returns to en-
trepreneurship (i) is on average higher for those who actually choose to become
entrepreneurs than for the average individual. We characterize this as selection
by comparative advantage. Equation (7) shows that the correlation between the
additive individual e¤ect in the earnings equation ("2i) and the error term in the
choice equation ("1i) prevents us from estimating ATT simply from observed earn-
ings di¤erentials between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (even if we control
for di¤erences in observed variables). The bias may be positive or negative: Those
with a higher earnings potential regardless of entrepreneurship may tend to become
entrepreneurs (such positive correlation between "2i and "1i can be interpreted as
selection by absolute advantage), or they may tend to remain wage earners (negative
correlation). Thus it is adamant to be able to control for self-selection when making
inferences about treatment e¤ects.
To address selection e¤ects discussed above, we allow "1i, "2i and i to be corre-
lated random variables. However, since we will not attempt to estimate AT only
ATT we do not explicitly model the correlation between "1i and i (more about
this below). To estimate equation (3), we will condition on the choice variable Ei,
and obtain expressions for the conditional expectations of "2i given Ei. To do so,
we rst note that we can write
"2i = 1"1i + e"2i, (8)
where e"2i and "1i are independent and
E("1i"2i) = 1. (9)
Dening Yit(E(i; t))  Yit and uit  uit(Ent(i; t)), the observed time series is
Yit = iEnt(i; t) + Z2it2 + "2i + uit; : (10)
Only one of the potential outcomes Yit(0) and Yit(1) is observed  the other is a
counterfactual outcome. To estimate (10) given that Ent(i; t) is endogenous and
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depends on "2i, we apply a control function approach, in the tradition of Heckman
(1979) and Garen (1984). That is, we will derive auxiliary variables that are com-
puted from the Probit analysis described above and include these as an additional
regressor (control function) in the earnings equation (3) thereby accounting for the
correlation between Ent(i; t) and "2i. The original earnings equation can then be
transformed into an equation with a genuine random e¤ect that is uncorrelated to
the explanatory variables. Our main result to this e¤ect is in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that ("1i; "2i) is binormally distributed with zero mean and
satises the conditions specied above, given by (8) and assume that E is determined
by the probit model (1)-(2). Then
E("2ijEi = e) = 1i(e)
where
i(e) =

 
e 1   Z1i1
   (e   Z1i1)
 (e   Z1i1)  
 
e 1   Z1i1
 :
The proof is standard, but stated in the Appendix for completeness. It follows
that we can express (10) as
Yit = Ent(i; t) + iEnt(i; t) + Z2it2 + 1i(e) + "

i + uit; (11)
where
i = i   
"i = "2i   1i(e)
and the random e¤ect, "i , has the property that E("

i jEi = e) = 0. Moreover, we
allow heteroscedasticity in the random e¤ect, "i , and an autoregressive structure in
the error term, uit :
V ar("i jEi = e) = 2(e), e = 0; 1
uit = ui;t 1 + it; it  i:i:d(0; 2")
Equation (11) is amixed model, with  (= ATT ) as the xed interest parameters
and i as the random parameters. To estimate  consistently by standard mixed
models methods, the following assumptions must hold:
Assumption 1 E(iuit) = 0 for all t
Assumption 2 E(i Ent(i; t)) = 0 for all t
Assumption 3 E(uitEnt(i; t)) = 0 for all t
Assumption 1 is standard, the rm-specic e¤ect of the treatment (measured as a
deviation from the average treatment e¤ect on the treated) must not depend on any
of the genuine error terms. Assumption 2 is satised given our previous assumptions:
Given (4), E((i   )jEnt(i; t) = 1) = E(ijEnt(i; t) = 1) = 0. Moreover,
E(ijEnt(i; t) = 1) = 0) E(iEnt(i; t)) = 0 (12)
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Assumption 3 comes down to independence of the treatment from the genuine error
term. The selection e¤ects are captured by the control function i(e), entering as
a linear regressor into the model. Note however, that the model allows i to be
correlated with "i .
Equation (11) is a standard mixed model, with a random coe¢ cient correspond-
ing to the variable Ent(i; t), a random intercept "i , and an autoregressive error
term, uit. A positive 1 (positive correlation between "1i and "2i) can be interpreted
as selection by absolute advantage, whereas a positive correlation between "1i and
i can be interpreted as "selection by comparative advantage.
It follows from (7) that
OD  ATT + 1E(i(1)  i(0)): (13)
Thus, to calculate treatment e¤ects, the parameters  and 1 and the control func-
tion i(e) are of interest.
A key issue is the search for valid exclusion restrictions (exogenous variation in
the discrete choice variable) with the purpose of identifying key structural parame-
ters associated with the returns to entrepreneurship.1 We discuss and implement one
exclusion restriction in the equation for the entrepreneurship choice (E): whether
a non-parent family member (e.g. brother or sister) is an entrepreneur (Lindquist
et al., 2015). Family entrepreneurship increases the probability of becoming an
entrepreneur, but does not a¤ect entrepreneurial earnings as long as parental entre-
preneurship is excluded from the set of identifying instruments (and showing up in
both equations). Parental entrepreneurship is associated with the transmission of
human and nancial capital that possibly may have a direct e¤ect on earnings.
The regression parameters in the above model can be estimated by standard
random e¤ects methods, such as quasi-maximum likelihood estimation based on the
assumption that all random terms are normally distributed. The reason is that the
rst order conditions are correctly specied and that the normal distribution is a
member of the exponential family (see Gourieroux and Montfort, 1995).2
The above framework estimates an average treatment e¤ect  (relative shift in
income) for all entrepreneurs irrespective of their initial investment in the rm.3 It
is quite easy within our current framework to allow heterogeneity in the treatment
e¤ects by letting ATT to depend on the initial investment. For example, dene
Ei = n i¤ n < X

i < n+1 , n = 0; 1; :::; K, (14)
where Ei = n, for n 2 f1; :::; Kg; means that the individual is an entrepreneur
and that the initial injected equity in the rm4 lies in some interval (Kn 1; Kn]. As
above, Ei = 0 for non-entrepreneurs. Dene corresponding variablesEnt(n)(i; t), n =
1; :::; K, which take the value 1 in all years when the individual is an entrepreneur,
given that his initial investment is n (ordinal variable), and 0 else. The average
1Within our framework such restrictions are not formally needed to obtain identication.
2We estimate the model using the mixed command in STATA.
3Even though we subtract a normal return on equity in our earnings measure, it may be the
case that individuals who start up large rms are systematically di¤erent (e.g. require a higher
risk premium) than those who start up smaller rms, or invest less.
4The minimum required injected equity for a rm is NOK 100,000.
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treatment e¤ect on the treated corresponding to Ei = n can then be written as
ATT (n)  (n) = E((n)i jEi = n).
We will present results for a version of this generalized (ordinal) model with K = 2,
and where Ei = 1 means that the injected initial equity is less than NOK 200,000
and Ei = 2 that the injected initial equity is at least 200,000. The highest category
comprises 1/3 of all incorporated entrepreneurs.
3 Denitions and data
The entrepreneur Most empirical studies have measured entrepreneurship in
terms of self-employment. This has lately become a much debated choice (Levine
and Rubinstein, 2013; Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014). A concept of entrepreneur-
ship that does not include incorporated rms will miss out on the most successful
entrepreneurs. O¢ cial statistics conrm that self-employment has not been an im-
portant source of labor income growth in Norway during the last decades, in contrast
to wage- and business income from incorporated rms.5
Using Norwegian registry data, Berglann et al. (2011) invoke a wider denition
of entrepreneurship. An entrepreneur is either employed in a rm in which (s)he
is a major/active owner (with at least 30 percent ownership or a combination of
+10 percent ownership and being a board member or a chief executive) or who
runs his or her own business as a sole proprietor. In other studies using Norwegian
registry data, Hvide (2009) and Hvide and Panos (2014) dene an entrepreneur as
an individual with a majority stake, i.e., more than 50% of the total shares, in a
newly established incorporated company. Both these denitions have limitations.
Regarding the owner-based denition, Luger and Koo (2005) point out that many
new rms are simply continuations of existing rms through a judicial reorganiza-
tion. Moreover, a large share of new rms are merely formal entities without real
economic activity (although Hvide, 2009, controls for this by imposing a minimum
threshold on the activity level).
We distinguish two types of entrepreneurship: self-employment and incorpo-
ration.6 Similar to Berglann et al. (2011), we dene an entrepreneur based on a
combination of ownership and control in a company. The entrepreneur must have
at least a blocking minority position in a privately held limited liability company
(>33%) and, at the same time, must be either an employee or have a formal man-
agement role (CEO, chairman of the board, or both) during start-up. The 33%
threshold includes both direct and indirect ownership positions in the rm (more
about this below)7. The choice of a threshold necessarily involves some arbitrariness,
but our criteria ensure that the entrepreneur retains a certain degree of control over
the rm and, at the same time, is an active owner. For entrepreneurs in the sense of
5See Fjærli et al., 2013, Figure 1.
6The latter category will later be divided into two start-up size groups.
7We acknowledge that the decision to start an incorporated rm is sometimes motivated by
tax planning, rather than entrepreneurship. At the same time, self- employment may be a close
substitute for wage employment, typically in the low end of the wage distribution and may also
have little to do with entrepreneurship in the classical, Schumpeterian sense.
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self-employment, we require that they run their own business as a sole proprietor.
For both types of entrepreneurship, we require that the rm is new. That is, persons
who become owner-managers or sole proprietors of already existing rms (e.g. who
take over a family business) are not classied as entrepreneurs.8
The earnings measure In contrast to a passive portfolio investor and ordinary
wage earner, the incorporated entrepreneur invests both nancial and human capital
in one and the same rm. In most cases, the ownermanager will have full control
and can easily transfer equity in and out of the rmwithout regarding the preferences
of other shareholders and conicts of interest. This also means that the entrepreneur
can decrease (increase) the level of prot in the rm by increasing (decreasing) her
own wage, possibly motivated by tax concerns (Astebro and Chen, 2014; Astebro,
2010; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007; Hurst et al., 2013).
Total earnings as the sum of labor income and ownership income from the en-
trepreneurs own rm are of interest when estimating the pecuniary returns to en-
trepreneurship. Unfortunately, realized business income (such as dividends) from
corporate rms is not a good measure of entrepreneurial earnings. First, they are
vulnerable to changes in taxation rules of particular importance for Norway in the
last decade where the pre-announced tax reform of 2006, for instance, led to a huge
step-up of dividend payments in 2005, and a sharp decline in the subsequent years.9
An additional problem is that business income for an entrepreneur will typically
consist of both returns to invested nancial capital (equity) and returns to human
capital (labor and e¤ort).
We propose a uniform measure of (pretax) earnings for all individuals in the
sample, whether self-employed, wage-employed, unemployed or owner-managers of
incorporated rms. It is the sum of labor income (from wages and self-employment),
work-related cash transfers (such as unemployment benets and short-term sickness
benets) and owner income from incorporated rms in which the individual is an
entrepreneur. The latter is denoted entrepreneurial owner income(in contrast to
general capital income, which is not included in our earnings measure, because it is a
return on a portfolio investment, not entrepreneurial e¤ort). Entrepreneurial owner
income is allocated to the owners of a rm in proportion to their ownership share,
and is dened as total taxable prot in a specic year after subtracting a normal rate
of return to the rms equity (injected equity plus accumulated retained earnings).
The latter is done to account for the opportunity cost of invested nancial capital,
which should not be counted as a part of the return to entrepreneurship (cf. Parker,
2009). The normal return is simply set to 4% which was the average (nominal) yield
on 10 year government bonds during 2001-2011.
Our approach is in the spirit of Hamilton (2000), but is based on much more
detailed accounting and ownership data at the rm and person level. It will, nev-
ertheless, still have weaknesses, for example because the rm may possess hidden
values not yet materialized as prots that may not be revealed until shares are sold.
8An entrepreneur may still be a wage earner in another rm than where (s)he is an owner-
manager.
9Also in 2002, when an increase in dividend taxation was largely expected, there was a bust in
dividend payments in an otherwise poor year for business owners.
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Identication of owners and ownership shares in the registry We focus on
private rms registered under the organizational forms AS (aksjeselskap/private lim-
ited company/incorporated rms) and ENK (sole proprietorship/self-employment)
between 2001 and 2011.10 We use data from di¤erent registers, covering the entire
population of rms and owners. These are:
 The Household register11. This register includes a wealth of information about
individuals and households obtained by merging several primary registers.
It contains annual information about income, wealth, education, and demo-
graphic variables, including identication numbers of individualsspouses and
relatives, for all persons above the age of 18 with permanent residency in
Norway.
 The Directorship register. This provides details for each individual appoint-
ment in positions such as general manager, chairman or member of the board
for AS rms and sole proprietors in the case of ENK rms.
 The Register of Employers and Employees. This contains data on employment
contract durations, wage and contractual working hours for each employee,
including sole proprietors (ENK rms).
 The Shareholder register. This register provides information about owners
(both individuals and rms) and their shareholdings from 2001 and onwards.12
 The Accounts statistics. This register contains data from the nancial state-
ments of AS rms.
 The Central register of establishments and enterprises, with information about
the establishment and termination of all registered rms (date of establish-
ment, date of closure, reason for closure (e.g. bankruptcy, merger, overtaken
by another rm, or unspecied). The register also includes information on the
rms industry (4-digit NACE), number of employees, turnover (total sales)
and location.
To identify entrepreneurs in the sense of sole proprietors we use the Directorship
register to identify the sole proprietor and the Central register of establishments and
enterprises to match the individual sole proprietor to a new rm. The register of
establishments and enterprises includes a binary activity code (active or non-active)
assigned by Statistics Norway; an active rm is required to have registered some form
of economic activity, such as positive turnover (total sales income) or payments
of value added tax. Newly established rms without registered activity are not
classied as established before they become active. Inactive rms are removed from
the analysis. This applies both to AS and ENK-rms, but is especially important
to ENK-rms (of which there is a higher share of inactive rms).
10AS owners are obliged to inject a minimum capital of 100 000 NOK at start-up and they have
no personal liability for the companys obligations.
11This is not formally a register, but a data base obtained by linking register based information
from several sources, including income and wealth information from tax records.
12Measures are slightly di¤erent for the 2001-2003 period due to a shift in data source.
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Identifying incorporated entrepreneurs is more complicated. We need to identify
the owners of newly established rms and their ownership shares. Moreover, we need
to determine whether they are employed in the rm or have an appointment in the
rm as general manager, chairman or member of the board. An owners ownership
shares in a company include both direct and indirect ownership through other rms
(see Fjærli et al., 2013, for details).13
The procedure applied to identify ultimate owners enables us to di¤erentiate be-
tween three levels of ownership. Level 1 represents direct ownership (the individual
shareholder owns part of the rm directly), while levels 2 and 3 indicate indirect
ownership (with, respectively, one and two rms acting as intermediaries between
the ultimate owner and the rm). For about 80% of the rms during 20012003
and 90% during 20042011, we identify all shareholders, indicating that most rms
in Norway are owned directly or indirectly through only one or two intermediary
rms.14
After identifying the ultimate personal owners and their ownership shares, we
merge the resulting databases with the Accounting statistics for the corresponding
years to add a series of rm characteristics. In the resulting matched owner-rm
data set, we keep only the rms for which accounting information exists. We also
exclude owners that cannot be matched with the Households register.
Sample selection Table 1 shows the total number of employed individuals (in
2001) who established incorporated (AS) or unincorporated (ENK) rms (rst and
second pair of columns, respectively) in the subsequent period 2002-2011.15 The
last pair of columns of the table displays total number of employed individuals in
2001 for men and women, respectively, i.e., individuals with a registered employment
relationship according to the Register of employers and employees (including self-
employed individuals). Hence the third pair of columns includes the rst two. The
entrepreneurs that can be identied in the data are displayed in the rst row of Table
1: There are 38,225 and 7,561 men and women, respectively, who become founders
of new incorporated rms during 2001-2011. The second pair of columns show that
there 83,961 men and 38,961 women who become sole properietors of new rms
during 2002-2011. Of the incorporated entrepreneurs in the whole population, 3,867
are rst registered as self-employed, and therefore included among the self-employed
entrepreneurs in Table 1.
13We identify several cases of cross-ownership, when rms simultaneously hold shares in each
other. However, as there are few such cases (between 308 cases in 2004 and 429 in 2005), and it is
di¢ cult to accurately establish who the ultimate owner is, we exclude cross-ownership cases from
our study.
14The di¤erence between the two periods is due to the change in data sources, which enabled
a more accurate identication of ultimate owners after 2003. Unidentied ownership shares may
correspond to a foreign or institutional investors. Foreigners cannot be identied through a Norwe-
gian personal number, while institutions (such as enterprises in the public sector) or listed (ASA)
rms are not included in our database.
15Holding companies (i.e., companies with an ownership share of minimally 90% in at least one
other rm in their rst or second year of activity) are excluded from the sample. We also exclude
rms in Financial intermediation (NACE 10). These mostly have portfolio investments as their
main activity. In addition, we exclude rms with an unspecied industry code and rms in the
primary industries (Agriculture and Fishing), as is common in analyses of entrepreneurship.
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Table 1: Sample selection: Entrepreneurs and reference population
Incorporated Self-employed Reference
entrepreneurs entrepreneurs population
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Initial sample size 38,225 7,561 83,961 38,366 1,159,838 1,039,098
Persons excluded because they are:
- already entrepreneurs 17,456 1,675 23,627 12,786 306,077 122,946
- above 62 years, or recipients of
disbaility or retirement pensions 547 341 2,727 1,961 33,721 97,293
- part-time employees 4,763 2,071 23,799 13,124 275,157 401,076
Final sample size 15,459 3,474 33,808 10,495 544,883 417,783
Some of the individuals in the employee-population are owners of incorporated
rms or self-employed in 2001. For reasons discussed above, we exclude individuals
who establish a rm, but are already entrepreneurs (e.g. serial entrepreneurs, or self-
employed entrepreneurs who incorporate their rm). That is, we exclude individuals
who are either i) registered as sole proprietors of existing ENK rms in 2001, or
ii) have an ownership share exceeding 33% in an existing incorporated rm, see
the second row of Table 1. In the third row, we also exclude individuals older
than 62 years in 2001 and recipients of disability- or retirement pensions. Finally,
we want to employ the initial condition regarding full-time wage employment in
2001. To operationalize the last requirement, we exclude persons who worked less
than 30 hours per week on average as a wage employee in 2001. The numbers
pertaining to this last exclusion operation are found in the third row of the table. The
numbers of valid entrepreneurs in the sample according to our denitions are shown
in the bottom row of Table 1; columns 14. The nal sample includes 15,459 male
and 3,474 female incorporated entrepreneurs (direct transitions from employment
to incorporated entrepreneurship) and 33,808 male and 10,495 female self-employed
entrepreneurs. The last pair of columns in Table 1 shows that the population of
individuals who potentially could make the transition from wage-employment consist
of 544,883 men and 417,783 women and is referred to as the "Reference population".
These are the individuals satisfying all criteria regarding employment status, age,
and of not already being an entrepreneur in 2001 (as we have dened it). This
sample forms the basis for estimating Probit models explaining the transition from
wage-employment to entrepreneurship.
A few additional remarks about the sample construction are in order. When
estimating the earnings equation we do not condition on a person being either a
full time employee or an active entrepreneur during the whole observation period
(i.e. we do not condition on any future labor market outcomes when selecting
the sample). If a person chooses to work fewer hours, or becomes voluntarily or
involuntarily unemployed he remains in the sample (unemployment insurance is
included in the labor earnings). However, to avoid complicating issues related to
retirement decisions, we censor all earnings observations above the age of 65 years.16
Moreover, we censor all observations (technically consider them as missing) in
16As shown by Berglann et al., 2011, entrepreneursretirement decisions are markedly di¤erent
from the reference population.
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each year that a person obtains social benets, disability- or retirement pensions,
or has earnings below/above a min/max threshold. The thresholds are chosen so
as to censor extraordinarily high and negative earnings observations symmetrically:
We remove the 0.5 percent lowest and highest observations in the total sample,
which amount to a lower and upper thresholds of NOK 10,000 and NOK 2,500,000,
respectively.
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Before we will estimate the earnings equa-
tion, we match the two types of entrepreneurs (the two treatment groups), with cor-
responding control groups of wage earners by means of propensity score matching.
Propensity score matching will ensure that the distribution of the vector of (ob-
served) matching variables, Si, is the same in both the treatment and control group,
and that Si will be independent of the treatment indicator, Ei, in the matched sam-
ple of treated and controls, as shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Our main
motivation for matching is to reduce the sample size when estimating the model de-
scribed in Section 2, which is necessary for computational feasibility. This does not
signicantly a¤ect the precision of the estimated treatment e¤ects. An important
additional advantage is that matching may alleviate biases if the functional form of
Si in the earnings equation is misspecied for example if the earnings equation is
linear in schooling, but (in reality) the marginal returns to schooling are decreasing.
Using PSM, the estimate of the treatment e¤ects would still be unbiased in that
case because years of schooling is independent of Ei in the matched sample. In the
unmatched sample, however, the estimator will be biased if entrepreneurs on average
are more (or less) educated than wage earners.
Our vector of matching variables, Si, consist of all the variables in Z1i (see
Table 4 ), except the identifying instruments: The dummy-indicators of non-parental
entrepreneurs in the family. The matching variables thus include a number of wealth,
education and demographic variables, such as, for example narrow eld of education,
age and years of schooling. The matching procedure used is the STATA routine
psmatch2 17. We use 1:5 nearest neighbors matching, but the matching algorithm
often nds less than 5 matches per entrepreneur. The estimates are not sensitive to
the choice of number of neighbors.
Descriptive statistics Table 2 shows that there is a considerable gender im-
balance in the population of entrepreneurs. Of the 18,933 incorporated entrepre-
neurs only 18% (3,474) are women (compared to 43% in the population of full-time
employed persons). For the self-employed entrepreneurs, 10,495 out of 44,303 are
women (24%). The distribution of education levels is quite similar for men and
women, and across types of entrepreneurship. A noticeable exception is the larger
fraction of entrepreneurs within higher tertiary education or Phd (18 years or more).
Table 3 shows the survival rates of both self-employed (S) and incorporated (I)
entrepreneurs by year of entry into entrepreneurship. Typically, exit from entrepre-
neurship means that all the entrepreneurs rms are closed down or have become
17See http://repec.org/bocode/p/psmatch2.html.
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Table 2: Distribution of educational level among entrepreneurs and in the
reference population
Education level Incorporated Self-employed Population
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Education level:
Primary school or lower
secondary education (10-) 13 % 15 % 21 % 15 % 20 % 19 %
Post-secondary education (11-13) 50 % 46 % 48 % 39 % 50 % 45 %
Lower tertiary (14-17) 25 % 32 % 18 % 31 % 20 % 30 %
Higher tertiary and Phd (18+) 12 % 7 % 10 % 13 % 8 % 5 %
N (in nal sample) 15,459 3,474 33,808 10,495 544,883 417,783
Table 3: Survival rates of incorporated (I) and self-employed (S) entrepre-
neurship, by year of entry into entrepreneruship
Year Entry-year of entrepreneurship
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
I S I S I S I S I S
2002 1.00 1.00
2003 0.90 0.99
2004 0.86 0.87 1.00 1.00
2005 0.78 0.75 0.89 0.96
2006 0.71 0.69 0.79 0.86 1.00 1.00
2007 0.67 0.58 0.72 0.70 0.90 0.93
2008 0.63 0.55 0.65 0.64 0.84 0.85 1.00 1.00
2009 0.55 0.49 0.58 0.54 0.76 0.72 0.91 0.93
2010 0.53 0.43 0.55 0.47 0.71 0.60 0.85 0.82 1.00 1.00
2011 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.40 0.65 0.52 0.78 0.70 0.90 0.93
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inactive.18 The table indicates that about 50% of the incorporated entrepreneurship
episodes lasts 10 years or more, compared to 40% for the (initially) self-employed
entrepreneurs. These di¤erences seem to be quite consistent over time, independent
of the start-up year of entrepreneurship. Note that these survival percentages are
higher than the usual ones due to the exclusion of necessity entrepreneurs from the
sample.
4 Results
The choice to become entrepreneur Table 4 shows the results for the Probit
equations of the choice to become an incorporated or self-employed entrepreneur,
given the initial state (in 2001) of full time wage employment. Because male and
female entrepreneurship and occupational choice decisions have been found to be
widely di¤erent, we estimate all coe¢ cients separately for males and females. The
vector of explanatory variables, Z1i, contains variables regarding the individuals
initial condition (in 2001), including region of origin, age, gender, wealth, years of
schooling and (narrow) eld of education (almost 100 categories). Our main iden-
tifying instrument, which in addition to functional form assumptions identies the
return to entrepreneurship, is a dummy variable indicating whether or not at least
one non-parent family member is an entrepreneur (self-employed or incorporated)
in 2001. We argue and show that this a¤ects the probability of becoming an entre-
preneur (positively), but arguably not entrepreneurial earnings directly. Family en-
trepreneurship has seldom been shown to a¤ect entrepreneurial performance, unlike
its great e¤ect on selection into entrepreneurship (Lindquist et al., 2015). Never-
theless, entrepreneurial parents may transmit their entrepreneurial talent, network
or experience to their o¤spring, thereby enhancing their performance as entrepre-
neurs. Therefore, we cautiously exclude entrepreneurial parents from the set of
identifying instruments and consider only non-parental family entrepreneurship. A
dummy identifying entrepreneurial parents is included in both the selection and the
performance equation.
The results in the table conrm that this instrument is, indeed, a relevant one,
with a z-values in the range of 11-17 for the four relevant coe¢ cients (correspond-
ing to combinations of two entrepreneurship types and gender). Other variables
with strong associations with entrepreneurship choices are: Years of schooling, Age
(inverted U-shaped relation) and Field of education. For incorporated male entre-
preneurship, initial wealth is the most important regressor in addition to years of
schooling. This is not the case for women. The estimated coe¢ cient of log-wealth
in 2001 is twice as large for men than women. For self-employment, initial wealth is
hardly of any importance at all. We also note that the positive association between
years of schooling and the propensity to become self-employed is much stronger
for women than men. The estimated association between having a parent who is
self-employed or a corporate owner-manager and (own) entrepreneurship is positive
18The exit year is the rst year when the entrepreneur is no longer the sole proprietor or owner
of any active rm which he/she has founded as an entrepreneur. Note that the transition from
sole proprietorship to incorporation does not imply exit, but is a continuation of one and the same
entrepreneurship episode.
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both for men and women, but only signicantly so for men. Compared to having a
non-parent entrepreneur in the family, these e¤ects are (surprisingly) small.19
Given the estimated Probit models of Table 4, it is possible to derive average
probabilities to become an entrepreneur during 2002-2011 for all individuals in the
reference population in a given category. Some noticeable numbers from such calcu-
lations are that: i) A male has on average a three and a half times higher probability
of making the transition from employment to incorporated entrepreneurship than a
female (2.8 vs 0.8 percent), and more than twice as high a probability of becoming
self-employed (6 percent vs 2.5 percent); ii) The only (narrow) eld of education
where women do not have a substantially lower entrepreneurship probability than
men is Medicine (about 25% probability for both sexes); iii) If (at least) one non-
parent family member becomes entrepreneur, the average probability that a man
(female) in the family also becomes entrepreneur increases from 2.45 percent (0.7
percent) to 4.6 percent (1.0 percent) for incorporated entrepreneurship, and from 7.4
percent (2.5 percent) to 5.9 percent (2.5 percent) for sole proprietorship. Point iii)
shows that our identifying instrument is a highly relevant predictor of entrepreneur-
ship, with the possible exception of female self-employment. However, the estimates
in Table 4 show that the corresponding coe¢ cient estimate is highly signicant also
in the latter case.
The returns to entrepreneurship Table 5 depicts the income distribution in
the control groups in 2001, i.e., average earnings (in NOK) in each decile, together
with ratios of average earnings between the treatment and control groups for the
years 2001, 2006 and 2011. While the corresponding control and treatment groups
have the same distribution with respect to the matching variables in 2001, they
do not have the same earnings distribution. Before they become entrepreneurs,
incorporated entrepreneurs have on average higher earnings than individuals in the
control group in all the deciles; that is, 10-40 percent higher and increasing with
higher deciles. On the other hand, self-employed entrepreneurs have almost the
same average earnings as the individuals in the control groups, except for the three
highest deciles, where they earn 5-10 percent more on average. Thus there appears
to be a signicant positive selection based on endogenous (unobserved) variables
into incorporated entrepreneurship, but not for self-employed entrepreneurs. This
selection bias cannot (and should not) be removed by matching, as it is not due to
exogenous variables.
The evolution of relative earnings over time is also interesting. Above the fourth
decile, the incorporated entrepreneurs (the "treatment group") tend to increase their
earnings advantage over the control group over time but substantially decrease
their relative earnings in the two lowest deciles. For the self-employed, there is no
evidence of increased relative earnings over time above the fourth decile, but clear
evidence of decreasing relative earnings in the three lowest deciles. These gures do
not say anything about the earnings prole for any given group of entrepreneurs,
as individuals may change earnings decile, or enter and exit entrepreneurship over
time. Nevertheless, they strongly indicate that there is a substantial di¤erence in
the pecuniary returns to entrepreneurship between the two types of entrepreneurs,
19It should here be noted that we are only able to identify living parents in our data set.
Table 4: Results from estimating the entrepreneurial choice equation
(Probit-model)
Dependent variable: Switch to becoming entrepreneur1) Incorporated Self-employed
Est. z Est. z
Female (dummy) -0.655 -4.1 -1.710 -17.1
Age
Male#Age (in 2001) 0.010 3.5 -0.016 -9.1
Female#Age (in 2001) 0.055 10.6 0.039 11.9
(Age/10)2
Male#(Age/10)2 -0.04 -11.8 -0.003 -1.6
Female#(Age/10)2 -0.09 -13.7 -0.073 -16.9
Years of schooling
Male#Years of schooling 0.049 27.3 0.015 10.5
Female#Years of schooling 0.033 9.8 0.041 17.5
Dummy for non-parent family- member
being entrepreneur:
Male 0.290 17.1 0.21 14.9
Female 0.242 14.2 0.13 10.8
Dummy for parent being entrepreneur:
Male 0.031 4.3 0.025 4.2
Female 0.021 1.8 0.003 0.4
log-wealth in 2001
Male#log-wealth in 2001 0.121 26.2 0.003 2.3
Female#log-wealth in 2001 0.068 12.4 0.012 5.4
No. of individuals in sample 962,666 962,666
1) In addition we have included dummy variables for narrow eld of education, country-of-
origin, and initial industry of employment (estimates are available upon request)
warranting a formal econometric analysis.
The parameters of main interest in the earnings equation are those of Table
6. The table shows the key results with regard to the estimated treatment e¤ects
(ATT ) and the control function accounting for selection, i. Results for the control
variables, Z2it, are depicted in Table A1 in the Appendix, with separate estimated
e¤ects for men and women.
The parameters of main interest are the estimated average treatment e¤ects on
the treated, denoted ATT in Table 6. ATT is dened in (6) for the case with one
average treatment e¤ect. However, the results in Table 6 distinguish between av-
erage treatment e¤ects along three dimensions: The rst dimension is with respect
to incorporation or self-employment. The second dimension is with regard to the
initial injected equity in the rm, which is either < NOK 200; 000 ("Small incor-
porated"), or  NOK 200,000 ("Large incorporated"), or "All incorporated". The
third dimension is with respect to gender: Separate earnings equations and Probit
(P) or Ordered probit (O) models of entrepreneurship choice are estimated for men
and women. In a third version of our model, no distinction is made between men
and women with regard to the treatment e¤ects, but a full set of interaction e¤ects,
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Table 5: Average earnings by decile in the control and treatment groups
(relative to the control group)
Earnings decile1) Control group Treatment group
earnings (in NOK) earnings relative to control group
Incorp- Self- Incorporated Self-employed
orated employed
2001 2001 2001 2006 2011 2001 2006 2011
1 160,063 146,808 1.08 0.64 0.36 0.99 0.56 0.55
2 223,427 204,792 1.07 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.79 0.82
3 254,782 239,058 1.08 1.04 1.01 1.01 0.89 0.92
4 279,284 263,299 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.02 0.94 0.97
5 303,300 285,951 1.11 1.13 1.15 1.02 0.97 1.00
6 329,929 309,994 1.14 1.18 1.20 1.03 1.00 1.02
7 363,188 338,869 1.17 1.23 1.25 1.03 1.02 1.03
8 410,298 377,859 1.22 1.30 1.33 1.05 1.04 1.05
9 487,511 442,244 1.28 1.41 1.43 1.07 1.06 1.06
10 685,497 616,882 1.39 1.82 1.72 1.12 1.12 1.09
Share active entrepreneurs2) 0 % 41 % 74 % 0 % 58 % 50 %
No. of individuals (N) 71,576 154,956 18,933 44,303
1)The highest and lowest one percent of the earnings observations (both in the treatment and control
groups) are excluded in each year 2)That is, E(i; t) = 1
Gender#Y , is included (it is the estimated coe¢ cients of Z2it from this model which
are depicted in Table A1 in the Appendix).
The estimated parameter ATT (All incorporated) is 0.031 (with a z-value of 8.2),
which corresponds to a mere 3.1 percent increase in earnings as a result of becoming
entrepreneur when no distinction is made with regard to gender or start-up size.
The estimated ATT (Men#All incorporated) and ATT (Women#All incorporated)
are identical. All treatment e¤ects are statistically signicant.
If we separate between small and large startups, we see that there is a marked
di¤erence in the estimated treatment e¤ects: 0.008 vs 0.102, respectively. The
estimated returns to entrepreneurship for individuals who establish small new rms
(with less than NOK 200,000 in injected equity), is only slightly positive with a
z-value of 1.9. For male entrepreneurs who found small incorporated rms, we get
a signicantly positive estimate of ATT of 0.012 (with z-value 2.6), whereas the
estimate for women is almost identical to zero. For large incorporated start-ups,
we nd some evidence of smaller ATT for men than for women; with estimates
equal to 9.2 and 6.1 percent, respectively. Both are signicantly positive. These
results indicate that small-scale incorporated entrepreneurs regardless of gender 
to a much lesser degree than large-scale entrepreneurs are motivated by pecuniary
returns. Small-scale entrepreneurship is probably a quite close substitute to ordinary
employment, and the main motivation for the business venture in this case may not
be a high expected pecuniary returns.
Most interestingly, we nd a signicantly negative return to self-employment.
The estimated ATT (Self-employed) is  0:065, i.e. a negative return of more than
6 percent (which is highly signicant, with a z-value of  34:7). The gender-specic
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ATT -estimates are respectively  0:067 for men and  0:099 for women both are
highly signicant. Thus self-employment seems to be even less motivated by the
prospect of pecuniary returns than small scale incorporation.
The coe¢ cient of the control function i(e) in Table 6 is a measure of the degree
of selection by absolute advantage into entrepreneurship (cf., the discussion in Sec-
tion 2). The positive estimates of around 0.06 (z-values above 40) for men and 0.04
(z-values above 14) for women, tell us that selection by absolute advantage strongly
characterizes the selection into incorporated entrepreneurship. Persons who become
entrepreneurs have cet. par. much higher earnings potential than wage-earners ir-
respective of their choice to become entrepreneurs. As a consequence, the average
observed earnings di¤erentials between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (OD)
everything else equal is higher than the ATT (cf. (13). If we exclude the con-
trol function i(e) from the model, the estimated ATT (All startups#incorporated)
increases with about 2 percentage points for all the di¤erent ATT -e¤ects of incor-
porated entrepreneurship. In contrast we nd no evidence of selection by absolute
advantage into self-employment. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cient of the control
function, i(e), is negative for male self-employed entrepreneurs ( 0:006), and even
slightly signicant, with a z-value of  5:8. We conclude that there is an ambigu-
ous e¤ect of general income ability on the propensity to become a self-employed
entrepreneur, but that the magnitude of the e¤ect is close to zero.
Table 7 displays the results for the second order moments. In general, the stan-
dard deviation, denoted sd(), of log-earnings for active entrepreneurs (that is, when
E(i; t) = 1), are much higher than in the control groups (Ei = 0); 0.55 and 0.68 for
incorporated and self-employed entrepreneurs, respectively, compared to 0.41 and
0.43, respectively, in the corresponding control groups. As expected, the earnings
dispersion for large incorporated entrepreneurs are larger than for small ones (stan-
dard deviations equal to 0.70 vs 0.64). These di¤erences can almost entirely be
attributed to being an active entrepreneur, as sd(uit) and sd("2i) are very similar
across the treatment (Ei > 0) and control groups (Ei = 0). Moreover, the estimates
of the autoregressive coe¢ cient  in Table 7 (equal to 0.59 and 0.55) reveal a high
degree of autocorrelation in the error term uit.
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Table 7: Estimates of parameters pertaining to the second order moments
of the earnings equation
Dependent variable: log-earnings Small1) Large All Self-
Startup size and type: incorp. incorp. incorporated employed
Control function derived from:2) O O P P
sd(log-earnings)jactive entrepr,Z2)3) 0.64 0.70 0.68 0.55
sd(log-earnings)jcontrol group,Z2)3) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43
Residual (uit):
AR-coe¢ cient () 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.55
sd(uit) 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.35
Random e¤ect ("2i)
sd("2ijtreatment group) 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.29
sd("2ijcontrol group) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
1) < 200; 000 NOK in initial injected equity 2)Ordered probit (O) or Probit (P)
3)Standard deviation of log-earnings for active entrepreneurs (Ent(i; t) = 1),
and in the control group (Ei = 0) conditional on control variables (Z2)
The estimated e¤ects of the control variables, Z2it, are displayed in the Appen-
dix (see Table A1). These are in general of a sign and magnitude as one would
expect from the empirical wage equation literature. Years of schooling and years
of experience are the most signicant explanatory variables in the model. An ad-
ditional year of schooling increases earnings by an estimated 6-7 percent (slightly
more for women than men). Years of experience has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect
on earnings. We see that there is a signicant negative impact from the interaction
variable nancial crisisentrepreneur (nancial crisis is a dummy for 2008-2009)
and that initial wealth (in 2001) has a positive impact on earnings in all years. For
a given level of schooling, the highest earnings are observed in the education elds
Social science and law and Business and administration. There are few notable dif-
ferences between males and females or across entrepreneurship types, with respect
to the impact of exogenous variables. In particular, the trend in log-earnings from
20012011 (not shown in the table) is almost identical for men and women, with
about 4 percent nominal annual increase on average. The e¤ect of having a parent
who is self-employed or a corporate owner-manager is ambiguous. Regardless of
entrepreneurship type, the e¤ect on earnings is positve for men (0.02), but negative
for women (-0.05).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have reconsidered the so-called entrepreneurial earnings puzzle,
i.e., the nding by most studies of zero or negative returns to entrepreneurship.
Our analyses have been based on two pillars: data improvements and model im-
provements. First, we have had the advantage of registry data comprising the whole
Norwegian labor population and all rms established in the period 2002-2011. Sec-
ond, these data have allowed us to identify both sole proprietors and owners of
incorporated rms and their ownership shares. Third, we have observed very de-
tailed measures of employment and entrepreneurship incomes in the registry. Our
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rich data have also allowed us to propose a uniform measure of (pretax) earnings for
all individuals in the sample, whether self-employed, wage-employed, unemployed or
owner-managers of incorporated rms. It consists of the sum of labor income from
wages and self-employment, work-related cash transfers and owner income from in-
corporated rms in which the individual is an entrepreneur.
Our analyses have focused on o¤ensive entrepreneurship, i.e. the transition
from full-time wage employment to entrepreneurship. We have also distinguished be-
tween unincorporated (self-employed) and incorporated entrepreneurs, and within
the latter group between largeand smallstart-ups. When estimating the re-
turns to entrepreneurship (the average treatment e¤ects on the treated), our model
has enabled us to take into account that the choice to become an entrepreneur is
endogenous with respect to earnings prospects.
The main bulk of results found in entrepreneurship journals pertain to self-
employment and usually nd zero or negative returns. In line with these ndings,
we found that the average return to entrepreneurship is signicantly negative for
individuals entering entrepreneurship through self-employment. On the other hand
we found that persons who become entrepreneurs by establishing relatively large
incorporated rms, increase their earnings by 10 percent on average by becoming
entrepreneurs. The latter results are more in line with studies including high end
entrepreneurs such as (variants of) incorporated entrepreneurship (Berglann et al.,
2011; Hvide, 2009; Hvide and Panos, 2014; Levine and Rubinstein, 2013), or even
billionaire entrepreneurs (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014). All these studies nd
positive returns to entrepreneurship.
Nevertheless, some of our results are surprising in view of comparable analyses
on registry data, especially Berglann et al. (2011), who nd that entrepreneurs are
overall generously rewarded in Norway. One explanation of this discrepancy may
be that they identify di¤erent entrepreneurs than us by e¤ectively conditioning on
future outcomes (i.e. that the entrepreneurship earnings is the most important
source of income). However, by conditioning on future outcomes, one does not
capture the full ex ante risk and reward of the transition from wage employment to
entrepreneurship.
One must be careful about drawing too stark policy implications of our results.
While OECD (2003; 2005) considers entrepreneurship as an important source of
economic growth and innovation in the economy, our results indicate that there
may not be much to gain in economic terms for the individual entrepreneur. In a
country like Norway with a high employment rate among both men and women
there may be less to gain both for the individual entrepreneur and society as a
whole through small-scale entrepreneurship than in countries where there are more
unemployed resources that may be mobilized into the labour market through self-
employment. Our analyses indicate that, at least to the individual entrepreneur, the
ordinary labor market may pay o¤ just as well at much less risk than managing
ones own business.
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Appendix: Supplementary materials
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Table A1: Parameter estimates of control variables in earnings equation
Dependent variable: log-earnings1) Incorporated Self-employed
Est. z [95% CI] Est. z [95% CI]
Interaction e¤ects males:
Years of schooling 0.06 123.5 0.06 0.06 0.05 138.2 0.05 0.05
Years of experience 0.04 178.1 0.04 0.04 0.04 238.6 0.04 0.04
(Years of experience/10)2 -0.08 -176.8 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -235.1 -0.07 -0.07
Field of education:
General programmes 0 (ref)
Humanities -0.08 -12.4 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -18.6 -0.08 -0.07
Teacher training 0.00 -0.6 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.5 -0.01 0.01
Social science and law 0.07 10.4 0.05 0.08 0.06 12.7 0.05 0.07
Business and adm. 0.13 41.3 0.12 0.13 0.11 44.5 0.10 0.11
Natural scienes 0.07 29.6 0.06 0.07 0.07 46.1 0.07 0.07
Health 0.04 6.9 0.03 0.05 0.07 18.4 0.06 0.08
Transport services. 0.10 22.6 0.09 0.11 0.07 23.7 0.07 0.08
Entrepreneur(dummy)#crisis -0.05 -19.7 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -12.2 -0.02 -0.02
log-wealth in 2001 0.04 55.3 0.04 0.04 0.03 79.8 0.03 0.03
Parent-entrepreneur (dummy) 0.02 5.7 0.01 0.03 0.02 7.61 0.02 0.03
Interaction e¤ects females:
Dummy for being female 0.15 3.9 0.07 0.22 0.22 12.2 0.18 0.25
Years of schooling 0.07 58.9 0.07 0.07 0.05 86.9 0.05 0.05
Years of experience 0.02 50.6 0.02 0.03 0.03 89.7 0.03 0.03
(Years of experience/10)2 -0.04 -42.1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -75.3 -0.04 -0.04
Field of education:
General programmes -0.06 -2.6 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 1.0 -0.01 0.04
Humanities -0.09 -3.9 -0.14 -0.05 0.00 0.1 -0.02 0.02
Teacher training -0.05 -2.2 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 4.9 0.04 0.09
Social science and law 0.03 1.1 -0.02 0.08 0.12 9.3 0.09 0.14
Business and adm. 0.04 1.7 -0.01 0.09 0.10 8.6 0.08 0.13
Natural scienes 0.03 1.1 -0.02 0.07 0.12 10.0 0.10 0.15
Health -0.02 -0.8 -0.07 0.03 0.07 5.9 0.05 0.10
Transport services. -0.02 -0.6 -0.06 0.03 0.03 2.4 0.01 0.06
Entrepreneur(dummy)#crisis -0.01 -3.5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -15.5 -0.04 -0.03
log-wealth in 2001 0.04 24.4 0.03 0.04 0.03 36.9 0.02 0.03
Parent-entrepreneur (dummy) -0.05 -9.5 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -12.6 -0.6 -0.04
1) Dummies for year and country-of-origin are included in the estimated model, but not shown
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